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ties . Although we enjoy a high standard of social welfare, we lack
the National Insurance administrative structure of which Professor
Ison proposes to make use. Constitutionally, the division of legis-
lative jurisdiction over social welfare between national and pro-
vincial authorities would create problems . And if the plan were
adopted by a single province, Professor Ison's proposal that non-
residents should be deprived of tort rights without being granted
compensation rights could produce unfair results.
Obstacles like these and a hundred others that could be listed,
together with fierce opposition from the insurance industry and
other influential vested interests, will undoubtedly prevent im
mediate implementation of the wholesale changes which Professor
Ison advocates . Only the patch-work approach to law reform
stands any real chance of success . But Professor Ison's visionary
study can be of great assistance to those who apply the patches over
the years, by indicating the goal towards which they should be
working.
DALE GIBSON*
Private International Law: General Part. By ALBERT A. EHREN-
ZWEIG. Leyden : A. W. Sijthoff . Dobbs Ferry, N.Y. : Oceana
Publications . 1967 . Pp . 293. ($10.50 U.S.)
Dicey and Morris on The Conflict of Laws . Eighth Edition. Under
the General Editorship of J. H. C . MORRIS, with specialist
editors. London: Stevens and Sons Limited. Toronto : The
Carswell Company Limited . 1967 . Pp. cxxv, 1289 . ($29 .30)
Private International Law, a comparative treatise on American
international conflicts law including the law of admiralty is an-
other major book written by Professor Ehrenzweig, one of the most
prominent and learned writers in this field of the law. For the
first time an attempt has been made to deal with United States
international conflicts law as distinguished from interstate con-
flicts law pursuant to the author's thesis that :
"Through at least a century American conflicts law has been
decisively affected by the demands peculiar to the quickly tighten-
ing relations between the states of the Union. But American doc
trine has failed to take account of the cleavage thus caused between
the resulting body of interstate rules and remaining tradition of
international conflicts law."'
*Dale Gibson, of the Faculty of Law, University of Manitoba, Winni-
peg.,




As Professor Ehrenzweig indicates on the cover, this work is
designed "on the one hand, to familiarize American courts, law-
yers, and scholars with the results achieved by five hundred years
of continental doctrine, and, on the other hand, to make accessible
to readers in the commonwealth and the civil law orbits of East
and West the unique laboratory of American experience and ex-
periments" .
There is a unique affinity between the world's legal systems in
the field of conflict of laws which cannot be ignored.
Actually, the book is primarily concerned with an analysis
and criticism of the various doctrines that have been advanced
throughout the centuries to explain why in cases involving a
foreign element the courts will, when appropriate, apply a law
other than their own to settle the issues presented to them . It also
contains an exposé of-Professor Ehrenzweig's views on the subject.
When reading this book, one cannot help but think of Professor
Eattifol's Aspects philosophiques du droit international privé,
another excellent work of the same nature written in 1956 by an
equally competent scholar. Although Professor Ehrenzweig states
that "This book will, I hope, be of some help to American courts
and lawyers who, when faced with an international conflicts case,
nowmust wade through texts and digests that call for the treatment
of such cases in the Context of interstate law",' it is probable that
very few practising lawyers in the United States and Canada will
find it of direct use in their daily practice unless they are especially
interested in the law of admiralty. Inclusion of admiralty was
intended by the author to fill a gap in the literature of both ad-
miralty and conflicts law as court practice in admiralty, being
increasingly concerned with conflicts problems, "is likely to streng-
then the development of an independent international conflicts law
in [the United States of America]".' This topic also enables him
to find further support for his lex fori approach.
A reader not thoroughly familiar with conflicts terminology,
current doctrines and American Practice-and the French, Ger-
man and Italian languages (as well as Latin), will find it extremely
difficult to read and fully understand what Professor Ehrenzweig
has to say. He will be ill at ease with words such as "neo-funda-
mentalism",' "new nationalist fundamentalism",5 "latter-day stât-
utist apergus",s "realist revolution",' or foreign sentences or words
such as "volkerrechtlichen Grundsdtzen",a "freundliche Zulassung";9
"pseudo-soggetto",1° or "respect de la souveraineté la plus inté-
ressée", 11 "si licet parvos componere magnis"18 which are not trans-
lated by the author.
2 Ibid., p. 9. 'Pp. 23-24. 4 P. 50. 'P . 51 . 6 P. 55 .
7P. 60 . s P. 54 . ' P. 57. 10 P. 113. 11 Ibid . 12 P. 65.
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In other words this book is not recommended reading for the
non-initiated, as it assumes too much knowledge on the part of
ordinary readers and is too condensed in its form . It is first of all
a scholar's book.
For those who have penetrated the inner sanctum of conflicts
law the rewards to be derived from a careful reading of the book
are great as we find here the quintescence of many years of serious
thinking by a man with an excellent background both in European
and American law. Of course one must not expect him always to be
objective; his analysis of the historical and doctrinal development
of conflicts law is somewhat biased as he is a man with a mission:
"To offer new solutions . . . in order to enable judge, lawyer and
scholar to predict and analyze judicial decisions"" and in the field
of admiralty to "help the courts in resisting the onslaught of that
new fundamentalism which, with its language of `governmental
interests' and `significant' contacts is now threatening the ramparts
of maritime jurisdiction". 14
Throughout the book, he never misses an opportunity to criticize
in very strong terms the original Restatement of the Law of Con-
flict of Laws as well as the Restatement Second." He fights against
fundamentalism in all its forms whether it be that of the Restate-
ments" or that of Professor Currie ."
The present General Part will be followed by a Special Part
to be devoted to choice of law as well as the law of international
jurisdiction and procedure.
An extensive bibliography to be found at the end of the book
adds to its value.
In the first chapter the author describes the scope and method
of the book.
From the point of view of methodology, Professor Ehrenzweig
is of the opinion that to consider interterritorial choice of law as
a "legal subject", as a branch of law with its own principles has
caused much difficulty. "In the absence of both formulated and
nonformulated rules, each rule of our municipal law should be
examined in its conflicts aspects.""
He also believes that one must distinguish between two broad
areas that require distinct treatment by scholar, judge and student.
"One area is primarily that of personal and proprietary relations .
Here need for certainty and the results of frequent testing have
produced many formulated rules of choice of law. . . . Concerning
these rules academic speculation is limited to the lex ferenda.
Discussion de lege lata as to the `theory' or `objects' and `structure'
will prove as remote and fruitless as in any other settled field of
13 P. 26 . "P. 228. "E.g. p. 26.
"Pp. 66 et seq., 116, 142. 17 See p. 62 et seq. 's P. 24.
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the law. The other area includes particularly the law of contractual
and delictual obligations . Here formulated rules are scarce . . . .
Here indeed, there is much room and need for re-examination of
inveterate doctrine in the light of new insights and experience, and
thus fornew `theory', not only in proposals de lege ferenda, but also
in the understanding de lege lata of yet nonformulated rules.""
And he adds :
"In ascertaining and stating these rules in a manner acceptable
to both common law lawyers and civilians, the greatest difficulty
is one that pervades all comparative endeavors, but is particularly
crucial in conflicts law with its virtual absence of legislation . Here
the varying priorities of judicial and scholarly doctrine become
all-important. In this book a compromise will be sought between
the techniques and ideologies prevailing in the two legal orbits : In
view of the superior practical experience of American case law and
the superior theoretical acumen of continental doctrine, fact situa-
tions adjudicated in the United States will be examined in the light
of both American judicial language and continental conceptions,
in both the General and the Special Part.""
Chapter two deals with the sources of international conflicts
in the United States of America.
The most important chapter of the book is no doubt chapter
three entitled "Theory" . It is also the most difficult to read due to
its abstract and condensed style. The part dealing with current
doctrine should be of particular interest to the reader as it is there
that Professor Ehrenzweig analyses and criticises the late Pro-
fessor Currie's government interests theory to the effect that a
court should apply its own law whenever the forum government
can claim a legitimate governmental interest that is "a reasonable
basis for the application of [its] law in order to effectuate the
specific policies that it embodies".Z. "A competing foreign govern-
mental interest is to be disregarded, since only the legislator is
capable of properly weighing and deciding conflicting interests.""
"A disinterested forum is to apply the law of that state which has
a reasonable interest . If more than one state can claim such an
interest, the disinterested court may either apply its own law or
that foreign law which it considers superior."" Professor Ehren-
zweig points out and I believe rightly so that : "Currie's theory
ss P. 25 .
z° Ibid.
zl Currie and Schreter, Unconstitutional Discrimination in the Conflict
of Laws : Privileges and Immunities (1960), 69 Yale L.J . 1323, at p. 1361 .
as Currie, Selected Essays in the Conflict of Laws (1963), pp . 357-358.ss Currie, The Disinterested Third State (1963), 28 Law & Contemp.
Prob . 754, at pp . 778, 788-789.
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remains vulnerable on several grounds. At least in terms, it ignores
the all-important fact that `governments' are, outside the law of
admiralty, `interested' in the solution of conflicts problems only
in such exceptional cases as tax or currency matters. Secondly,
Currie's distinction between the governmental interests existing in
the `effectuation' of policies, and these policies themselves, is quite
obscure. And the selection of foreign interests, even if relevant,
even if identified with policies, and even if based on forum policy,
would face courts with an impossible task . To determine policy
`even in connection with one's own legal system . . . is often very
difficult to do ; how much the more so with respect to foreign law' .
Moreover, any choice-of-law rule based on the `legitimacy' or
`reasonableness' of interests is as wrong or circular as any theory
based on legislative jurisdiction, vested rights, or the `significance'
of contacts . Such a rule is wrong if legitimacy and reasonableness,
like `vesting', `jurisdiction' and `significance', are deduced from a
nonexisting superlaw . And such a rule is circular in so far as it
must, in recognition of the nonexistence of such a superlaw, be
based on rules of choice, a need for which it is designed to avoid.
The same circularity, as we shall see, affects Currie's non-choice
disposition of `false problems'.
Most important for present purposes : Currie's theory was not
devised for international conflicts cases. Its very ancestor, the
`governmental interests' language of the United State Supreme
Court, was merely used in interstate cases to deny a constitutional
compulsion to apply the lex contractas or delicti of a sister state.
Never was a `governmental interest' held or said to be capable of
constitutionally compelling or excluding application of any law,
let alone an extranational law. Decisive, however, in this respect
is the fact that Currie's theory stands and falls with the avail-
ability of a legislative body able and willing to find, if not to re-
solve, the conflict. Only because Currie feels that Congress could
and should declare its preference for one state's interest over that
of another, does he call for the application of the forum's law
in the absence of such a declaration . Since no legislative body is
available on the international scene outside the treaty area, courts
of all countries must look, and have in fact looked, for solutions
other than one that calls for the application of the lex fori whenever
the forum has an `interest' in such application .
As we shall see, all courts and writers who have adopted
Currie's language, have therefore rejected his basic message. They
have insisted on weighing competing interests and given effect to
what they have held to be the prevailing one. And since such
holdings are always based on the forum's own policies, courts




from that of policy. With this transformation, Currie had lost not
merely a battle, but his war.""
"In its final form, Currie's theory permits and expects courts to
apply foreign laws even in the presence of a legitimate forum in-
terest . They must do so, we now learn, if that interest can be con
strued in `restraint and moderation', as a long-range `enlightened
self-interest', `altruistically' inducing regard for another state's
competing interests. Not only did Currie with these formulas re-
turn to statutist tradition with its 'side-glance' at the foreign law's
intent, but, contrary to his earlier crucial distrust of judicial dis-
cretion, he now entrusted the courts `with an exacting task for
which instructions have notbeen furnished' . He thus destroyed that
one value of his analysis, that of relative certainty, in favor of an
uncharted regime of those very rules of choice whose abolition he
had demanded. The best that can be said, I fear, for a govern-
mental-interest terminology, is that `it does not harm to say that
. . . policy analysis is a continuing search for governmental interests,
provided we recognize that what we ought to do in any event is
to analyse the problem in terms of all the relevant choice-of-law
considerations, of which the interest behind the forum's internal
rule is only one'."25
The Restatement's Second "most significant relationship and
legislative jurisdiction" does not escape Professor Ehrenzweig's
acerb but nevertheless constructive criticism: -
"At first glance, the Second Restatement appears to join the
revolution . For its predecessor's right formulas, the leges contrac-
tus, delicti, and domicilii, it has substituted a near-general refer
ence to the law of the `most significant relationship', based on
`contacts' and `interests', not only in the ever changing laws of
contracts and torts, but even in such a stable field as that of the
law of trusts . But such tests are mere 'catch-words representing at
best not methods or bases of decision but considerations to be
employed in setting up new rules or laws required by changing
times. Counting up "contacts" or locating the "centre of gravity"
or weighing the respective "interests" of two states can never be
a satisfactory way of deciding actual lawsuits . . .' . The Institute's
new formula thus entails serious danger for the administration of
justice, since it is all-too-easily used by busy courts which, were
it not for that formula, would articulate the policy grounds of their
decisions for the guidance of other courts and parties.""
The last part of this chapter contains an exposition of Pro-
fessor Ehrenzweig's theory, the so called "lex foci approach"."
After stating that conflicts rules refer or should refer to individual
$a Pp. 63-64 . "P . 65 .
26 P . 67. "P . 90 et seq .
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foreign rules rather than foreign legal systems or "jurisdictions""
he points out that :
"Unless application of a foreign rule is required by a settled
(formulated or nonformulated) rule of choice, all choice of law
should be based on a conscious interpretation de lege lata of that
`domestic rule' which either party seeks to displace . If that inter-
pretation does not lead either to the dismissal of the suit or to
the application of a foreign rule, the forum rule, in a proper forum
applies as the `basic', or as I now prefer to call it, the `residuary'
rule, as a matter of `nonchoice' . In this sense, any rule applied as
a matter of choice or nonchoice is a `rêgle d'application immédiate,
`rliumlich bedingte Sachnorm', `direct rule', and thus tied to muni-
cipal institutions 'comme l'ombre ou corps parce qu'elles ne sont
pas autre chose que le projection de ces institutions elles-mêmes sur
le plan du droit international' . In this sense, then, there is no con-
flicts law because there can never be a conflict, true or false, be-
tween the rule of a forum and any other rule invoked by it . As
Dicey has it : `The only "conflict" possible is . . . that in the mind of
the judge who has to decide which system o£ law to apply to the
facts before him ' ."Z9 "Assume that, in the absence of both formu-
lated and nonformulated (true) conflicts rules, interpretation of
the domestic rule and its policy has neither referred us to that rule
as applicable to foreign facts nor to a foreign rule, and that this
interpretation does not require the court to dismiss the case. On this
(unrealistic) assumption, the court will apply its own rule as the
residuary rule"," or as the author calls it "a trend to stay at home",
and he adds "the recognition here proposed of the domestic rule as
that both basic for the application of foreign rules and residuary in
case of their nonapplication, would compel and permit articulation
of those forum policies which call for the application of a foreign
rule and would thus avoid overgeneralization of both rules and
exceptions"."
As for the foreign rule, in the absence o£ a settled formulated
or nonformulated rule of choice, it is applied by virtue of an
interpretation of the domestic rule in the light of its policy ."
Chapter four is devoted to an analysis of the structure of con-
flicts rules. The author when discussing characterization points out
that, "The controversy between the adherents of the lex foci and
the lex causae disappears if we realize that characterization, unless
contained in a formulated rule, is just another phase in that pro-
cess of interpretation which is common to all legal reasoning. For,
all interpretation, unless regulated by rules of construction, be it
of instruments or of laws, is always that of the interpreter, the
28 P. 75 . 29 P. 93 . "P . 103 . 31 P. 105. 32 P. 99 .
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forum. It should, therefore, not have been necessary for modern
legislation expressly to subject characterization to the lex fori".33
He recognizes that, although characterization under the lex
causae, be it primary or secondary, must be rejected, it may be
necessary to adjust characterization under the lex fori to different
concepts of the lex causae by what he calls recharacterization."
Renvoi, although perhaps the most fertile and futile source of
learned discussion in conflict of laws, has hardly produced a pro-
portionate interest in judicial practice in the United States or
Canada" and should be rejected. The solutions arrived at by resort
to this doctrine can be reached by other methods such as common
sense interpretation of the forum policies involved in the particular
situation."
After reviewing all the arguments pro and con the renvoi,
Professor Ehrenzweig comes to the conclusion that renvoi statutes
and conventions can be successful only if limited to such narrow
fact situations as the nationality-domicile conflict."
The author acknowledges that reliance on public policy for
application of the lex fori has always been the last resort of any
court faced with an overgeneralized rule of choice of law." How
ever he points out that in the absence of rigid conflicts rules it is
unnecessary to resort to public policy in order to achieve justice
in cases involving foreign elements. This explains why in Canada,
England and in the United States of America as opposed to
countries where conflicts rules are codified, very few cases have
been decided on the basis of public policy.
Actually, the present structure of choice of law "is largely the
result of an overgeneralization of formulated conflicts rules, follow-
ing the replacement of the statutist choice of rules by universalist
schemes of chosen `laws', based on partly publicist, party con-
ceptualist theories. With the progressive reduction of this over- .
generalization and return to a choice of rules, resort to the several
phases of the structure becomes ordinarily dispensable"."
Chapter five devoted to the "Application of the foreign rule"
contains valuable suggestions based on comparative law. The
author examines in turn situations 'involving, a failure to plead a
foreign rule as applicable, and a failure to prove the applicable
foreign rule.
Whenever the lex fori is applied, it is notthrough apresumption
of identity but by virtue of a residuary rule .
In the process of ascertainment of the foreign law, Professor
Ehrenzweig, after examining the defects of the present system,
comes to the conclusion that "perhaps court-appointed advisors
0a P. 115. 84 p. 118 . `P. 141. 111 See p. 143.
s' Pp . 152-153 . "P. 153. -" P. 177. -
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who would be subject to both parties' and the judge's questioning
and whose fees would be collected from the losing party, might
come closest to a satisfactory solution"."
The last chapter is entitled "Choice of Law in Admiralty:
Epitome of Conflicts Law" .
The author is of the opinion that general conflicts doctrine may
draw a needed lesson from admiralty law "whose development has
been compressed in a short century, unburdened by ancient doc
trine and assisted by common-sense considerations freely ex-
pressed" ." Thus ". . . we shall see that the initial and primary
role of the law of the forum, which is so controversial for conflicts
law in general appears overtly in the past and current practice of
admiralty . This fact has so far protected admiralty from that dis-
orderly growth of `imperative' conflicts rules which has disturbed
general conflicts law ever since the decline of imperial superlaws"
Professor Ehrenzweig then proceeds to analyse the various
techniques by which admiralty courts have justified the application
of their own law. He recognizes that "In admiralty, too, it is true,
there are unmistakable signs of danger . `Statutist' advocacy for a
ubiquitous law of the flag, on the one hand, and a, fortunately yet
isolated, inclination toward the nonrule of the most significant
relationship, on the other hand, threaten to do to the conflicts law
of admiralty what fundamentalist and nihilist doctrine has done to
conflicts law in general":"
Fortunately "courts, in admiralty have so far largely avoided
this danger by adhering to their unilateral interpretation of both
doctrine and statutes, and by limiting choice of law to specific rules
based on treaty, custom, statute, and precedent. And they will, we
may hope, be enabled to continue to do so by a wise and fair
limitation of their jurisdiction" ."
Although one may not agree with all the theses advanced by the
author, one must recognize that he has been true to his objectives .
New solutions are offered that are based on comparative experi-
ence, learning, and deep comprehension of +he subject matter .
To many the lex fori approach represents a reasonable and to
some extent logical philosophical basis for conflicts law which at
the present time is caught between revolution and counter revolu
tion . To others it is only one explanation which like many others
constitutes merely one step in the process of evolution of the law
throughout the ages .
The eighth edition of Dicey and Morris on the Conflict of Laws
prepared by Dr. Morris and other specialists'' does not differ sub-
4o p. 192. 41 P. 196. '= Ibid . ' 3 P. 197. 44 Ibid .
45 Messrs Leonard Hoffmann and G. H . Treitel, Drs O. Kahn Freund,




stantially from the previous edition. Although it is primarily de-
signed for practitioners, it is interesting to note that the authors
have given more space to theory and structural analysis. No
change has been made in the general arrangement of the book .
However, the editor has abandoned the practice originated by
Dicey, of stating positive rules of law in the form of exceptions to
negative propositions . For instance the rule in Armitage v. Att.-
Gen." and the rule in Travers v. Holley" are no longer exceptions
to a rule that foreign divorces will not be recognized in England if
the parties were not domiciled in the foreign country." The effect
of this change of policy is that the number of Rules and Exceptions
has been substantially reduced. "This does not mean that we have
lost faith in the mode of exposition by Rule, Comment and Illustra-
tion that has always been a characteristic feature of Dicey."" The
editor recognizes, however, "that the Illustratives form the most
debatable element in the trilogy and that opinions may differ on the
wisdom of retaining them" ." Even though care has been taken to
indicate whether each Illustration is intended to be a summarized
statement of a reported case, a variant on a reported case or is pure-
ly hypothetical, I would prefer to see the summary of reported cases
transferred to the Comment, which could also contain some in-
dications as to what the courts might be expected to decide in cases
that have not yet come before them . To incorporate. the facts of
decided cases in the Comment would not necessarily make it less
readable . This, it seems to me, would make the Comment easier to
understand and less abstract. Also one may not always agree with
the choice of Illustrations . Of course the Illustrations facilitate the
work of students who have not read the assigned cases, they also
help law professors to prepare examination questions?
The eighth edition contains a very important new chapter
entitled The Time Factor" that deals with changes in the content of
the conflict rule of the forum, or in the content of the connecting
factor, or in the content of the foreign law to which the connecting
factor refers."
Many passages are entirely new." Of particular interest are :
Rule 47 on jurisdiction to make declarations as to status ;"" Rules
4s See for instance Ch. 5 (The Time Factor) and Ch . 30 (Torts), es-
pecially pp. 916-918, 937-939.
47 [19061 P. 135. 48 [19531 P. 246 (C.A.) .
"See (7th ed., 1958), pp. 310-324, rule 43, now see rule 40(2) and
(3), pp . 308-324.
"° Preface, pp . ix-x. "x Ibid., p. x. sz Ch. 5, p. 40 et seq.
"In Canada see Castel (1961), 39 Can. Bar Rev. 604.
54 See for instance, pp. 76-77 on judicial residual discretion to refuse to
recognize a foreign status conferred or imposed upon a person by the law
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100 and 106 on the formal validity of wills" which present and
analyse the Wills Act, 1963,5' that gives effect to the Fourth Report
of Private International Law Committee" and to a Draft Conven-
tion on the Formal Validity of Wills made at the Hague in 1961 ;5'
and the analysis of recent American developments on the choice
of law for torts." It should be noted that Dr. Morris' prophetic
words that "there are somewhat faint indications that it may not
be entirely impossible for an English court to adopt this more
flexible approach, [social environment test, law of the state having
the `greatest concern' in the case] at any rate in a situation in
which the nationality or the residence or place of business of all
the parties concerned indicates their social environment at the
time when the tort was committed. .. . were approved by Lord
Denning in Boys v. Chaplin." In Chapter 14 devoted to matrimon-
ial causes, the reader will regret that the book was published just
before the House of Lords gave its decision in Indyka v. Indyka,
a case that revolutionizes the law with respect to the recognition
of foreign divorce decrees." Several passages of the book have
been almost entirely rewritten."
Finally the definition of the proper law of a contract has been
altered "to make it conform with the more recent judicial formu-
lations"."
The eighth edition of this classic work will continue to prove
most helpful to all those who are interested in the development of
English conflict of laws . Although a few Canadian cases and
statutes are cited in the book, I do not believe that this is sufficient
material to satisfy Canadian practitioners as it can no longer be as-
sumed that Canadian conflict of laws, is the same as English conflict
of laws . In the last twenty years, Canadian courts and legislatures
have often adopted rules that differ materially from those followed
in England." Furthermore, some of the English conflicts rules are
of no use in Canada as they fail to take into consideration the
Ss Pp. 596 and 618. 5 ' 1963, c. 44 . 11 (1958), Cmnd 491 .ss (1961), 10 Int. & Comp. L.Q. 45 . In Canada, see Castel, Conflict of
Laws (2nd ed., 1968), p. 770 et seq.
6s Pp . 916-918, 937-939. si Pp. 917-918.
62 [19681 1 All E.R. 283 (C.A.), now before the House of Lords. See
also the pioneer article by Dr . Morris, The Proper Law of a Tort (1951),
64 Harv . L. Rev. 881.
63 [19671 2 All E.R. 689, [19671 3 W.L.R. 510 and Bale (1968), 46
Can. Bar Rev. 113.
"See for instance, pp. 374-377 on the recognition of foreign nullity
decrees, pp . 461-478 on the recognition of foreign adoptions and the right
of adopted children to succeed to property .
e5 Preface, p. xi . See Rule 127, p. 691 .
"See for instance new Divorce Act, 1968, S.C ., c . 24. D. Mendes da
Costa, Some Comments on the Conflict of Laws Provisions of the Divorce
Act, 1968 (1968), 46 Can. Bar Rev. 252. Castel, op . cit., footnote 59, p.
442 et seq .
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special demands of the members of the Canadian federation . Thus
Canadian sources and textbooks must be consulted. Of course,
this does not mean that inspiration cannot be found in this ex-
cellent, although perhaps overly conceptualized," eighth edition
of Dr. Morris' work .
J.-G. CASTEL*
Tribunals of Inquiry. By SIR CYRIL SALMON. London: Oxford
University Press. 1967. Pp . 5, 23 . (8/6 d.)
This short book is a printed address given by Sir Cyril Salmon
in Jerusalem in 1967. His topic is an analysis of how tribunals
of inquiry may allay the public fears caused by disquieting rumours.
Such rumours and allegations may occur in any country in which
the people enjoy free speech, and therefore Sir Cyril's arguments
may be pertinent throughout the Western world.
It is clearly desirable for any tribunal of inquiry to be free
of political influence . Any tribunal whose members proportionately
represent the government of the day and the opposition is heir to
this defect . It should always be possible for the general public to
unreservedly accept the report of a tribunal of inquiry because
otherwise such a tribunal has not served its purpose even if its
report has reached the right conclusion . From various examples
Sir Cyril draws the conclusion that the tribunal should not seem
to be hostile to those appearing before it . However, the tribunal
should be to some extent inquisitorial because the purpose is to
elicit truth, something which the adversary system employed by
the common law courts is not equipped to do .
Sir Cyril conceives the two main functions of the inquiry to be
to establish the truth and to protect those appearing before it from
"injustice and unnecessary hardship". With respect to the estab
lishment of the truth Sir Cyril emphasizes the importance of the .
members of the tribunal devoting all their attention to the tribunal.
This may seem axiomatic but the startling fact is revealed that
only three of the seven Members of the Warren Commission heard
more than half the testimony. The Warren Commission could have
done more to prevent the uneasiness that subsequent writers and
the general public have felt about their findings of fact concerning
President Kennedy's assassination . Sir Cyril also mentions the
"Note that though the editor purported to abandon I)icey's foreign
vested rights theory, p . 8, Rule 2 states that "The court will not enforce
or recognize a right, power, capacity, disability or legal relationship arising
under the law of a foreign country . . .", p . 72 .
*J.-G. Castel, of Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto .
